An onto-cosmological argument for the existence of God
I am going to present a brief argument for the existence of God.
Three assumptions
This argument proceeds on the basis of three assumptions:
A1. Whatever a thing has which does not belong to it simply in virtue of what it is, it receives from something else. (Principle of Sufficient Reason)
A2. If a thing exists in actuality but does not possess actual existence simply in virtue of what it is, then it receives its actual existence from something else. (implication of A1)
A3. God is whatever possesses actual existence simply in virtue of what it is.
A1 is quite intuitive. Effectively, it implies that if it is ever insufficient to respond to the question “Why does this thing have that quality?” with: because it is of such-and-such a nature, then it is necessary to appeal to something else, outside of the thing in question, in order to provide an answer. For example, if we ask “Why does Steven have the capacity for learning language?”, it is enough to respond: because Steven is a human being. The capacity to learn language belongs to human beings by nature. But if we were to ask “Why does Steven know how to speak English?”, it is not enough to respond: because Steven is a human being. This is because speaking English does not belong to human beings by nature. Being human is not enough for knowing how to speak English, even though it is enough for having the capacity to learn language. After all, there are human beings who do not know how to speak English. For this reason, in order to answer the question “Why does Steven know how to speak English?”, we have to appeal to things outside of Steven — such as his parents, his teachers, and so on.
The other assumptions are straightforward. A2 is an implication of A1. It obviously presupposes that existence in actuality is something that a thing can “have” in some sense. Personally, I do not find that a controversial or contentious notion at all. As for A3, it will be defended below.
Presentation of the argument
With those assumptions explained, it is now possible to proceed to the argument. It is as follows:
- Something exists in actuality. (premise)
- This thing which exists in actuality either (a) possesses actual existence by nature, i.e. simply in virtue of what it is, or else (b) receives actual existence from something else. (A1)
- If (a), then God exists. (by A3)
- If (b), then it must ultimately receive existence in actuality from something that possesses actual existence by nature, simply in virtue of what it is, i.e. God. In other words, there cannot be an infinite regress of sources of actual existence which do not exist in actuality by nature. (premise)
- Therefore, God exists.
Defense of the argument
Let us consider the argument premise by premise.
As for (1), this premise seems to me uncontroversial. Even if we entertain Cartesian doubts about the actual existence of anything else outside of us, at the very least each of us can be certain that he or she exists in actuality.
As for (2), these are the only options available to us, according to the first assumption of the argument. What is not possible is that a thing exist as actual which does not possess actual existence simply in virtue of what it is, nor does it receive it from anything else. This is not possible because it would amount to something come from nothing: the thing would exist in actuality without having to exist by nature, and yet there would be nothing to explain the fact that it exists.
As for (3), the identification of God as that which possesses actual existence by nature, i.e. simply in virtue of what it is, will be explained below.
As for (4), this point can be understood quite intuitively. Effectively, the important distinction is between things to which something belongs originally and those to which it belongs derivatively. A thing possesses a quality originally when it possesses that quality simply in virtue of what it is. It possesses that quality derivatively when it possesses it but only in virtue of something else. The idea is that it is not possible for anything to possess a quality derivatively unless it is ultimately on the basis of something else which possesses it originally. This can be illustrated by means of a number of examples.
First example: Heat belongs originally to fire whereas it belongs only derivatively to a pot and to the soup in the pot. If there were no fire which is originally hot, then it would not be possible for the pot and the soup to be derivatively hot.
Second example: Suppose that Peter wants to borrow money from Paul. Paul tells Peter that he will lend him with the money he is owed by James. James tells Paul that he will repay him with the money he is owed by Andrew. Andrew tells James that he will repay him with the money he is owed by Nathaniel. And so on. Each person is trying to lend money on the basis of what he is owed by someone else. But unless someone simply has the money available without appealing to someone else—i.e. unless someone simply possesses the money originally and not derivatively—the money could never be lent. There is nothing to have derivatively that is not possessed originally in some way!
Third example: Suppose that x = y + 1; y = z + 1; z = a + 1; a = b +1; and so on. Is it possible to determine the value of x? It would seem not. If no variable possesses a value in an original way but only derivatively, depending on the value of another variable, then none of the variables actually have any value at all. This would mean that it is impossible to determine the value of x. In fact, it would mean that x in fact has no value. It seems that way, since we say that x = y +1. But this is an illusion, because y does not actually have a value.
Each of these examples is supposed to show that the derivative possession of a quality (whether it is heat, or money, or numeric value, or whatever) is only possible on the condition of the original possession of that quality. So also, suppose that a thing exists in actuality but only derivatively. This means that it receives its actual existence from something else. But unless it receives its actual existence from something that possesses actual existence originally, i.e. simply in virtue of what it is, then it would not be possible for this derivatively existent thing to exist. There could not be a derivative existent without an original existent. This is why premise (4) is true.
Defense of A3
The argument thus shows that something exists which possesses existence simply in virtue of what it is. According to A3, this “something which possesses existence simply in virtue of what it is” is God. But this will not be obvious to very many people. Why couldn’t any old thing which exists simply exist in virtue of what it is? It is therefore important to make the identification with God more explicit and justifiable.
Here is the important argument in defense of A3:
- God is whatever exists in actuality simply in virtue of what it is.
- No this-such exists in actuality simply in virtue of what it is.
- Therefore, God is not a this-such.
The language of “this-such” comes from Aristotle. A this-such is an individual being (something to which you can refer by saying this) that has various distinct properties (something which is such). Some of these properties might belong to the thing simply in virtue of what it is, like the capacity for learning language belongs to human beings simply as humans. Other properties might belong to the thing only in virtue of other things with which it has come into contact, such as my own capacity to speak English is a result of my being taught it by my parents and teachers.
The purpose of this sub-argument in defense of A3 is to show that existence is not a constituent part of any this-such. This means that no this-such has existence simply in virtue of what it is. The proof of this is as follows. As Husserl notes in various places such as Ideas I and Logical Investigations, the this-such is given to consciousness qua this-such, but its existence in actuality is not given but only ever presumed. The existence in actuality of a this-such is not something given along with it in the experience of it. This is the point of skeptical arguments such as the “brain-in-a-vat” argument which Hilary Putnam considers. Even to the brain-in-a-vat, things are given as this-suches but not as existing in actuality. One can investigate any this-such given to consciousness at great length, turning it about and trying to see it from all sides, discovering any number of its hidden properties, even putting it in different situations and circumstances in order to see how it might interact with other objects. In none of these investigations, however, will one stumble upon the existence of the this-such as one of its properties. There is no experiment to be done, no conditions in which an object can be put, such that one would then uncover the actual existence of the this-such. It is always possible that some this-such given to consciousness nevertheless does not exist in actuality. This in fact occurs relatively often, as when we dream about things that are not real. But it is not merely the things we dream about that account for their unreality, since we can dream about persons and other this-suches who really exist. Rather, the possibility of non-actuality of any this-such given to consciousness is a proof of the fact that existence in actuality does not enter into the composition of the this-such. The actual existence of the this-such is something else which must come from outside of it if it is to exist in actuality at all.
This shows that no this-such exists in actuality simply in virtue of what it is. On the other hand, God is that which exists simply in virtue of what it is. This means that God is not a this-such. God as that which possesses actual existence simply in virtue of what it is is not an individual being with various distinct properties. We might say rather that He is simply pure subsistent being, pure actuality. He is that from which everything else ultimately gets its actual existence, whereas He simply possesses actuality in virtue of what He is.
